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There is (or should be) a clear and logical track from 
National Strategy to naval missions to desirable behavior 
by naval officers.  Furthermore there is (or should be) a 
coherent structure of incentives to encourage that 
behavior.  And, since the Age of Sail, the Surface Navy has 
recognized the importance of incentives.  This thesis 
focuses on lessons learned from the 19th Century and how 
those lessons apply today.  It examines the U.S. National 
and Military Strategies for the late 20th Century and early 
21st Century, and how the incentive structure for the 
surface officer community does (or does not) support those 
polices.  The major conclusion is that incentive structures 
for today’s surface officer community generally will 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PREFACE 
This thesis investigates how incentives can be aligned 
to support the United States Grand Strategy. In the realm 
of military affairs, it has always been prudent for 
countries to learn from previous experience and to learn 
from the practices used both by themselves and their 
opponents.  The same argument can be made for the use of 
incentives in the military. There are many principles that 
are considered in the alignment of incentives to promote a 
country’s Grand Strategy.  The principles specifically 
addressed in this thesis are: 
· Organizational Make-up and Culture 
· Risk 
· Incentives and Controls (Internal and External)  
As with any organization, the culture and composition 
of the group is an important element when understanding its 
decision making process.  One focus of our research is to 
define the elements of structure, culture, and external 
forces in the Surface Navy.  
Our consideration of risk and accountability focuses 
on senior political and naval leadership perspectives of 
what is acceptable risk in support of a country’s Grand 
Strategy.  Our research shows how important incentives are 
as a management tool in ensuring a successful execution of 
a country’s Grand Strategy.  
These principles of incentives and controls will focus 
on how military incentives have been aligned to achieve 
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military capabilities and performance in support of the 
Grand Strategy.   
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
This research identifies and analyzes the issues 
associated with the use of incentives as a management tool 
for achieving a country’s Grand Strategy.  It considers the 
use of management control systems as they relate to 
incentives for the U.S. and Great Britain in the 19th 
century, lessons learned, and their applications in today’s 
U.S. Navy.  Finally, the thesis focuses on financial and 
non-financial incentive programs.  The Surface Warfare 
Officer Continuation Pay (SWOCP), the Thrift Savings Plan, 
and a reduction of inspections in port are current 
incentives for the Surface Navy.  Based on our findings, 
future recommendations for the use of incentives for the 
21st century in support of the U.S. Grand Strategy are 
provided. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
Are incentives for Surface Warfare Officers in line 
with the Grand Strategy for the United States in the 21st 
century? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
· How did the Americans and British use incentives 
to their advantage during various conflicts (19th 
century until today)? 
· What were the imperfections in the incentive 
systems and how did the American and British 
Navies cope with them? 
· Based on the U.S. Grand Strategy of the late 20th 
century did the government have the right 
incentives for Surface Warfare Officers? 
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· What is the Grand Strategy for the United States 
for the 21st century? 
D. SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION 
The scope of the thesis includes:  
· A comprehensive review of incentives, as 
management tools in the 19th century.   
· An examination of lessons learned and how those 
lessons are applied in today’s Navy.   
· An analysis of how the U.S. Navy has modified 
incentives as a means of maintaining 
organizational stability. 
Chapter II discusses the incentives of the U.S. and 
British Navies in the 19th century, and Chapter III 
discusses the lessons learned by the U.S. Navy of today, 
and their application. Chapter IV focuses on incentives for 
the surface warfare community during the late 20th century. 
The chapter discusses U.S. Grand Strategy for the late 20th 
century, manpower issues the surface community faced, and 
how incentives did or did not align with the strategy.  
Chapter V discusses the U.S. Grand and U.S. Military 
Strategies for the 21st century, to preclude the effects of 
11 September 2001 on the U.S. Navy. Chapter VI discusses 
incentives for the 21st century. Specific issues addressed 
are the SWOCP, the Thrift Savings Plan, and possible future 
incentives. Chapter VII concludes the thesis. It reviews 
the primary and secondary thesis questions, summarizes 
research conclusions, and offers recommendations on the use 
of incentives in the surface community.  
E. EXPECTED BENEFIT OF THE STUDY 
This thesis is intended to benefit the Department of 
the Navy (DON) by showing that the lessons learned in the 
past can be utilized in today’s incentive programs.  
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History has shown that the proper incentive structure 
can help ensure that a country has a strong military that 
is capable of and motivated to promote and execute its 
Grand Strategy.  Therefore, the ability to construct the 
right incentive package will help alleviate future manpower 
problems and ensure that we have a strong Surface Navy, as 
the U.S. faces new challenges in the future. 
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II. INCENTIVES FOR NAVIES DURING THE 19TH CENTURY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will discuss the incentives used by the 
British and American Navies during the 19th century to 
recruit and maintain sailors in the Navy.  An important 
factor to consider throughout is that “Incentives Matter”.  
The history gives a background of how both navies had 
problems properly staffing their forces and how they 
structured their incentives accordingly.  This chapter 
discusses exactly what each Navy did to formulate and 
execute their incentive policies.  Finally, the chapter 
will discuss the problems that each navy had arising from 
perverse incentives. 
B. HISTORY 
The 19th Century British Navy was an effective fighting 
force, not because of it’s physical and human capital but 
because of the set of rules under which the British fought.  
“In 1708 the British government enacted the ‘Cruizer (sic) 
and Convoys Act’.  One of its effects was to formalize the 
process of prize taking, giving practically all the money 
gained from the capture of enemy vessels to the captors 
‘for the better and more effectual encouragement of the Sea 
Service’.  There were about 17,000 voyages of treasure 
ships in the 19th century actually available for prize 
money.  Every prize appeared before the High Court of 
Admiralty for ‘condemnation’” [Ref. 1].  It laid down exact 
regulations for dividing the proceeds among the various 
interested parties.  The act was altered in 1808 changing 
the distribution of prize money.  If warships were captured 
or destroyed the admiralty paid head money at the rate of 
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£5 per head.  This was also used to encourage the captain 
to fight his ship and if he was successful it meant a 
possible promotion. 
Table 2.1 shows how the prize money was distributed 
among the captors of the prize vessel. [Ref. 1] 
 
Distribution of Prize Money 
RANK Pre 1808/ SHARE 
Post 1808/ 
SHARE 
CAPTAIN 3/8* 2/8** 
CAPTAINS of Marines, 
Lieutenants, Master and 
Physician, = share in 
1/8 1/8 
LIEUTENANTS of Marines, 
Secretary of Admiral, 
Principal Warrant 
Officers, Masters 






Officers Mates, Marine 
Sergeants, = shares in 
1/8 
THE REST = shares in 2/8 
4/8 
*Flag Officers to have one of Captain’s Eighths. 
**Flag Officers to have one third of Captain’s share. 
 
Table 2.1. Distribution of Prize Money. From: [Ref. 1] 
 
The central incentive for senior officers in the 
British Navy was compensation through an efficiency wage1, 
which would reward captains if they were successful and 
remained at sea.  Because the potential payoff was really                     
1 Efficiency wage revolved around taking prizes or spoils of war.  It 
encouraged captains to hunt for lucrative prizes instead of pursuing 
more strategic objectives. [Ref. 2:p. 3] 
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big, most captains would certainly want to remain at sea 
for as long as possible provided there were prize vessels.  
The captains were therefore encouraged to go out and look 
for those prizes, training their crews for action. [Ref. 
2:p. 3] 
With the efficiency wage, the British Navy also used 
the “Articles of War, battle formations and fighting 
instructions, discontinuous promotions, and patronage to 
monitor their captains.”  This system of governance was 
intended to encourage captains to fight their ships instead 
of avoiding the enemy.  With this in mind, the captains 
were motivated to train their crew and devote more 
attention towards winning. [Ref. 2:p. 3]  In order for a 
captain to be successful, he had to overcome the 
temptations of avoiding the risk of combat. Another 
temptation that the captains had to overcome was seeking 
private wealth at the expense of a naval objective.  Prize 
money was always the biggest temptation because that was 
how they could make the most money.  In some cases, many 
became wealthy. 
The British had many more captains than they had 
ships.  If a captain or admiral was not at sea, then they 
were on half pay.  The captains on half pay were more 
likely those who had made mistakes, failed to capture an 
enemy ship, were simply unfortunate, or failed in other 
ways.  While at sea, a captain made twice the wage plus had 
the potential to earn great profits through prize money.  
The list of captains waiting to command a ship was pretty 
long.  Although seniority played a huge role in how the 
captains were chosen, it didn’t always end up that 
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seniority was the only factor.  The Admiralty was free to 
choose who it wanted commanding its ships. [Ref. 2:p. 13] 
A negative outcome in a battle at sea was not always 
the captain’s fault.  If the ship was under sail, it was at 
the mercy of the winds, which could keep it from entering 
battle or simply arriving on time.  This made it difficult 
for the Admiralty to determine whether or not the captain 
was being cowardly or just the unfortunate victim of an act 
of nature.  Another problem during the 19th century was 
communications, which was usually limited to visual ship to 
ship communication. 
The monitoring of a captain’s output became much 
easier when steam was introduced in the first half of the 
19th century.  Steam made shirking duty almost impossible 
for the captains.  
In the early days of the United States Navy, prize 
money and privateering was what most people thought the 
Navy was about because that was what the British and French 
strived for.  Privateers were an incalculable benefit to 
the United States because of the damage they inflicted on 
the enemy; but they also were unreliable.  Although prize 
money was an advantage, sailors in the U.S. Navy did not 
join for that reason.  They joined for travel and 
adventure, hence the recruiting slogan “Join the Navy and 
See the World”.  A survey of 2,340 officers and enlisted 
sailors was conducted in the mid 1960s, as to why they 
joined the Navy: 81% joined because of love of country or 
patriotism, and 91% because they wanted to travel.  [Ref. 
3:p. 40]   
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The trouble with the Navy during this time was poor 
leadership. Every captain was for himself.  Crews were 
raffish, undisciplined, underpaid and underfed. [Ref. 4:p. 
219]  There were not many incentives for joining the Navy, 
which led to a chronic shortage of high-grade personnel.  
The early U.S. Navy consisted of over 50% foreigners from 
about nineteen nationalities. 
Other reasons for the lack of Americans in the Navy 
were the demand for hard work and limited rewards, if any.  
The hours were long, and they often spent many months away 
from their families and homes without any extra 
compensation. [Ref. 5:p. 7] 
In April 30,1798 the Navy Department was organized.  
It was then determined that there would be no more 
“Politicking” and squabbling over prizes.  The Navy would 
have to establish incentives for recruiting and retaining 
sailors.  It first started by increasing sailors’ wages.  
Merchant seamen were being paid $10 a month, so the Navy 
would pay $15.  [Ref. 4:p. 219] 
The Navy also started recruiting more educated people 
or provided a means of educating them.  Matthew Calbraith 
Perry was responsible for instituting training cruises for 
boys and cadets, and also for the establishment of the 
Naval Academy in 1845.  Stephen B. Luce established the 
Naval War College in 1884. [Ref. 6:p. 10] With the 
establishment of the Naval Academy, the Navy would start 
assessing more officers.  
C. THE BRITISH APPROACH 
By paying their officers an efficiency wage, the 
British Navy encouraged its officers to want to 
be at sea.  Once at sea, the officers were under 
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the fighting instructions that essentially forced 
them to engage the enemy, and that monitored 
their actions. [Ref. 2:p. 31] 
The lure of prizes was the most effective weapon in 
recruiting seaman, because piracy was in effect made legal.  
British seamen generally thought of cash rather than glory 
as they sailed into battle.  An ordinary seaman under an 
enterprising and fortunate captain made more money than an 
officer in other ships. 
Appointment to one of the well-known prize money 
commands would mean an almost automatic fortune.  Flag 
officers could hope to gain sums well in excess of 
£1,000,000 at today’s values. [Ref. 1] 
For young gentlemen who inherited nothing from their 
family, and decided to make a career at sea, prize money, 
had the potential for huge bonuses. “Nelson often bemoaned 
his lack of prize money, being posted to ships away from 
good prize areas and, in later years, the success of his 
fleet meant there were precious few prizes to be had.” 
[Ref. 1] 
D. THE U.S. APPROACH 
When the United States Navy was established many 
British practices for discipline, regulations and 
traditions were adopted.  The American uniform was also 
established in honor of Horatio Nelson, who was known as 
one of Britain’s best. [Ref. 7:p. 3] 
The American leadership eventually learned they needed 
other incentives for recruiting and retaining members.  
With the establishment of the Naval Academy, there was an 
increase in the officer ranks, but not in the number of 
enlisted personnel.  The Nurse Corps  1908) and the Dental 
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Corps (1912) were also established.  In 1920 the pension 
plan was established, which was an incentive for sailors 
looking into the future. [Ref. 8]  These were major 
incentives because sailors would not have to worry about 
medical or dental care for their families. 
E. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS 
1. British 
The British prize money system described in section 
(B) was far from perfect.  Prize Agents handled prize 
money, and payment sometimes took years.  This caused much 
frustration to captains and crews, while the agents earned 
large sums in interest.  
A worse irritant for young officers was the 
Admiralty’s threat to his prize money.  “It was relatively 
common for a hopeful young commander and his men to find 
that after a hard won capture, the Admiralty proposed to 
appropriate the entire value of the prize.”[Ref. 9:p. 37]  
The courts were unsympathetic and corrupt; even if the crew 
won the case, the cost of the proceedings often swallowed 
up more than the sum they were entitled to.  They could not 
go public because their employment and promotions lay in 
the hands of the Admiralty. [Ref. 9:p. 38] 
Sometimes officials of the courts had shares in the 
vessels and the investments would not be forfeited, so the 
crew would not be rewarded the prize.  Instead they were 
billed for the court proceedings. 
No Captain was ever penalized for surrendering, but 
any sign of cowardice was severely punished. [Ref. 2:p. 9]  
If a British ship encountered an enemy ship then the 
British were expected to engage regardless of the 
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difference in size. [Ref. 2:p. 21]  Article 10 in the 
Articles of war states that: 
Every Captain or Commander in the fleet, who, upon 
signal or order of right, or sight of any ship or 
ships which it may be his duty to engage, or who, upon 
likelihood of engagement, shall not make the necessary 
preparations for fight, and shall not in his own 
person, and according to his place, encourage the 
inferior officers and men to fight courageously shall 
suffer death, or such other punishment, as from the 
nature and degree of the offense a court. [Ref. 2:p. 
20] 
There were times when a captain’s actions would 
determine whether or not the crew would be awarded the 
prize money and also whether or not the officer would be 
promoted.  An example occurred in 1801 when LT Cochrane and 
his crew captured the enormous ship “GAMO” which came with 
a large prize money, the Admiralty charged Cochrane with 
insubordination; the crew was not rewarded with the money 
and Cochrane was not promoted.  Instead the Admiralty chose 
to sell off the ship. [Ref. 10:p. 51] 
2. United States 
With the establishment of the Naval Academy, the 
United States Navy was producing too many officers and not 
enough enlisted.  This was a big problem because during 
this time the Navy was promoting on seniority, vice merit, 
which resulted in few promotions. [Ref. 5:p. 31]  It also 
meant that the best officers were not being assigned to the 
higher leadership positions. They remained as junior 
officers longer and the Navy eventually lost them. 
Another problem facing the U.S. during the 19th century 
was having the majority of its forces being foreigners.  
There was no effective way of controlling them, with over 
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17% of them deserting as of 1882.  In addition the 
government would offer foreign-service members U.S. 
citizenship, but most would not take it. [Ref. 5:p. 6]  
Communications were difficult because English was not a 
primary, or even the secondary, language for many service 
members.  With nineteen nationalities serving in the Navy, 
the language barrier could lead to a misunderstanding of 
orders.  Often orders had to be repeated several times, or 
even translated, which would waste a lot of time. 
By the turn of the 20th century, the American Navy had 
very few foreigners.  During that time they also had a 
problem with too many battleships being built with 
personnel shortages.  The Navy could not keep up with the 
building of the battleships, which meant ships were sent to 
sea undermanned.  Again this would mean that the sailors 
would be overworked, as well as underpaid.  [Ref. 5:p. 32] 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The system of prize money and the possibility that 
large sums might be obtained even by ordinary seamen 
provided the Royal Navy with its greatest romantic 
attraction and motivations for joining the Navy. The 
wartime incentives for the British centered on prize money; 
as long as the crews were at sea, there were always 
possibilities of making large sums of money. If Captains 
didn’t engage their ships there was a chance they would be 
punished by death.  There were often mixed feelings for the 
Captains because if they didn’t engage their ship they 
could possibly die; if they engaged their ship, but didn’t 
win, then they didn’t get the prize money.  The British 
were well known for winning most battles, so although there 
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were perverse incentives it was generally best for the 
British to engage their ships. 
The major problem that the British faced was that they 
didn’t always get the prize money when they captured the 
enemy.  They were often at the mercy of corrupt court 
systems that would sometimes appropriate the prize money, 
or sell off the captured enemy vessels. 
The U.S. Navy tried to learn from the British by 
adopting some of their traditions.  Eventually the U.S. 
realized that there was a need to attract American sailors 
and to retain them.  With the establishment of the 
retirement system, plus medical and dental care the U.S. 
made an improvement with regards to recruiting.  The 
establishment of the Naval Academy and the Naval War 
College helped the U.S. in not only recruiting, but also 
educating their Naval Officers.  
The U.S. Navy’s problems centered on retaining U.S. 
citizens vice foreigners in the service.  The Navy had to 
devise incentives to keep its sailors for the long term.  
The Navy finally realized that it would have to reform its 
retirement system as an incentive to the younger sailors.  
The Navy would also have to work on compensation incentives 
to compete with the private sector along with quality of 
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III. LESSONS LEARNED AND APPLICATIONS TODAY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will discuss the lessons learned from the 
19th Century and beyond that are applicable in today’s Navy.  
The primary lesson learned once again is that “incentives 
matter”. Three major lessons regarding incentives that will 
be discussed are:  1) prize money, 2) improved financial 
incentives, and 3) continued improvement in quality of life 
issues. 
This chapter will also discuss additional incentives 
that are applicable in today’s Navy. Improved education 
will always be the focus of any organization (or should 
be), and will be discussed.  However, most of the 
incentives besides quality of life considerations are 
financial in nature.  Of the financial incentives, both the 
uniform personnel retirement system and pay allowances will 
be discussed.   
B. LESSONS LEARNED 
As previously mentioned, “incentives matter” was the 
major lesson learned by both the U.S. and British Navies.  
Both navies realized that to address problems in retention 
and manning, they needed to structure their incentives in a 
manner that would attract citizens to the Navy.  As 
discussed in Chapter II, desertion was a major issue for 
the U.S. Navy.  However, through financial incentives, 
quality of life improvements, and appropriate legislation, 
desertion is no longer a major problem for the Navy.  As of 
1994 desertion constituted less than 4.02% of military 
offenses in the Navy compared to the 17% in 1882. [Ref. 11] 
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Another lesson learned was that quality matters for 
both enlisted personnel and officers.  The British were 
known to have the best Navy in the 19th century and it 
wasn’t because of numbers.  There were times when the 
British forces were out-numbered two or three to one by 
their enemy; yet the British still won consistently. It was 
not what material you have but how well you can use it.  
For the British, prize money became the crews’ incentive to 
be better trained and tactically proficient.  Incentives 
were a major reason why the British Navy was consistently 
successful in battle with relatively few casualties. 
For the U.S. Navy, prize money, as an incentive was 
not an option the President and Congress wished to 
entertain.  Instead of prize money, the U.S. Navy used 
incentives such as retirement pay and education.  These 
incentives were used as a means to entice citizens to join 
the Navy, and retain current members.    
Today’s military has learned that continued 
improvement of financial incentives is necessary to recruit 
and maintain a strong force. To that end, continued 
improvements in bonuses, reenlistment pay, and base pay are 
ways that allow the Navy to compete with companies in the 
private sector.  As the U.S. economy continues to grow, the 
Navy’s ability to provide financial incentives for sailors 
will have a direct bearing on retention and manning.    
Finally, quality of life will always be an issue for 
senior naval leadership.  Current initiatives to improve 
the quality of life for afloat surface warfare officers 
include reduction of inspections and more time at home 
while in port. [Ref. 12] The Navy has also made a concerted 
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effort to improve the shipboard conditions for sailors.  
Unlike the 19th Century today’s naval vessels have such 
things as gyms, modern galleys, and air conditioners to 
improve the living environment. [Ref. 13]  
C. U.S. APPLICATIONS TODAY 
The Navy is constantly reviewing and adjusting its 
incentive programs as a means to compete with the private 
sector and to meet retention and manning needs of the 
fleet.  To close the gap between the private sector and the 
military, bigger raises are likely required in the future.  
The Senate has proposed that military annual pay raises 
through 2006 be a half percentage point higher than wage 
growth in the private sector. Currently the gap is about 
7.6% and is estimated to be about 4.8% by 2006. [Ref. 14:p. 
8]  This is a positive incentive for retaining service 
members because they will be earning pay more comparable to 
their contemporaries in the private sector.  Recently, 
certain mid-grade petty officers, senior enlisted, and mid-
grade officers have been targeted to receive higher pay 
raises in an effort to reduce the shortages in those pay 
grades. [Ref. 14:p. 8]  
Another compensation initiative is the Basic Allowance 
for Housing (BAH), which subsidizes pay for military 
personnel as a means to find private housing arrangements.  
The military is trying to increase the rates yearly to 
reduce the out-of-pocket expenses to the service members.  
Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) is also another improvement 
used to defray the cost of living overseas.  COLA 
compensates for a portion of the costs for non-housing 
expenses that exceed costs in an average U.S. military 
location by more than 8%.  This incentive provides 
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financial compensation to those service members and their 
families for service overseas. [Ref. 13] 
The commissary and exchange programs are other 
benefits for military service.  Since there is no taxation 
on military installations service members save an average 
of 25 percent a year for purchases in the commissary and 
exchange.  The savings incurred by shopping on military 
installations result in an increased buying power for the 
service member. [Ref. 13] 
The education system gives all members a variety of 
means to further their education.  This system is in 
extensive use today.  Officers have options of continuing 
their education through the Naval Postgraduate School, 
various War Colleges, and other institutions.  Enlisted 
personnel have an opportunity to use The Montgomery GI 
Bill, which allows service members to attend school on 
their own time.  The enlisted personnel also have an option 
of getting a commission through various programs such Naval 
Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC), Enlisted 
Commissioning Program (ECP) or Broadened Opportunity for 
Officer Selection and Training (BOOST). 
The retirement system is still in effect and one can 
retire at twenty years. The Military Reform Act of 1986 
created the REDUX retirement system, which reduced the 
retirement rate at twenty years from fifty percent to forty 
percent for anyone joining the military after July 1986. 
This law was repealed because in order for any sailor to 
get 50 percent retirement they would have to stay in the 
Navy for almost twenty-three years.  In 1999 the retirement 
system was changed to take effect in FY 2000 and now 
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service members have options for retirement.  The following 
table shows the options: [Ref. 15] 
 
AFTER 20 YEARS FINAL BASIC PAY HIGH-THREE 
MILITARY 
RETIREMENT 
REFORM ACT w/ 
choice of Career 
Status Bonus 
APPLIES TO: Persons in Service Before Sept. 8, 1980 
Persons Joining 
From Sep 8, 90 Thru 
Jul 31, 1986 
Persons Joining 
After July 31, 1986 
BONUS AT 15 
YEARS NONE NONE $30,000 
BASIS OF 
COMPUTATION: 
Final Rate of Basic 
Pay 
Highest 36 Months 
of Basic Pay 
Highest 36 Month of 
Basic Pay 
MULTIPLIER: 2.5 Percent Per Year of Service 
2.5 Percent Per 
Year of Service 
2.5 Percent Per 
Year of Service 
Less 1.0 point per 
each year short of 
30 (one time 
adjustment at age 
62) 
Cost of Living 
Adjustment: Full CPI-W Full CPI-W 
CPI-W minus 1 
Percent (One-Time 
Catch up at age 62) 
 
Table 3.1. Three Military Retirement Systems. From: 
[Ref. 15] 
 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The Navy must continue to recruit high quality 
personnel to keep U.S. forces ready and to maintain the 
proper mix of junior, mid-grade, and senior service 
members.  The applications of the lessons learned from the 
19th Century and beyond have allowed the Navy the 
flexibility to compete with the private sector.  
Improvement of both financial and non-financial incentives 
allows the organization to address the issues of retention 
and manning as they occur.  Due to the demands of military 
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life, the Navy must continue to reinforce its long-term 
commitment to continuously improve the standard of living 
for sailors.  Improvements in bonuses, housing, and 
shipboard working and living environment will provide 
rewarding career opportunities. [Ref. 16] 
Education continues to be a top priority, as more 
opportunities are made available for both officers and 
enlisted personnel.  Educational opportunities continue to 
be a cornerstone of the Navy’s quality of life programs.  
Over the years the Navy has ensured that parity is built 
into the educational programs and other quality of life 
programs across all bases. [Ref. 13] 
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IV. INCENTIVES LATE 20TH CENTURY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will discuss the U.S. Grand and Military 
Strategy for the late 20th Century, and the post-Cold War 
era.  Manpower issues for the period will also be 
discussed, and will primarily focus on the reduction of 
military forces as the Soviet threat waned. Finally, the 
chapter will discuss the incentives for Surface Warfare 
Officers and their impacts. 
By the end of this chapter it should be clear that the 
incentive structure for the surface warfare community was 
to support the new shift in U.S. policy.  With the collapse 
of the Soviet Union the threat of a large-scale war 
decreased and there was no longer a need for as large a 
U.S. military force as prior to that collapse.  To comply 
with this new direction the Navy restructured its forces to 
meet the mandated reductions. Congress also provided 
financial incentives for military personnel to get out to 
the service.  
With the end of the Cold War the U.S. Grand and 
Military Strategy underwent a dramatic change. Defense 
spending decreased as politicians turned their focus from 
the threat of a military strike from the Soviet Union to 
domestic issues and the economy.  The task for the military 
was to reorganize with less money, reduced manpower, and to 
focus primarily on joint military operations. 
Three papers defined how the Navy was going to 
transition from a force focused primarily on the Soviet 
Union to a force structured for multi-regional conflicts.  
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The first of these papers was written in April 1991, “The 
Way Ahead” [Ref. 17] which focused on the structural and 
doctrinal transformation in the post-Cold War era.  In 1992 
the white paper “…From the Sea” [Ref. 18], provided 
additional direction for Naval/Marine Corps strategy in the 
early 1990’s.  Two years later, in 1994, the final major 
white paper “FORWARD…From the Sea” [Ref. 19] provided 
updated naval strategy for responding to multiple regional 
conflicts. 
The chapter will show that these military strategies 
were all based on a new U.S. Grand Strategy in the post-
Cold War era. While these white papers were produced in the 
early 1990’s, they remained the foundation for U.S. Naval 
strategy throughout the decade.  They proved so prescient 
that later statements of naval strategy were mostly 
revisions along the same basic themes.  Moreover, these 
naval strategy statements proved congruent with later 
national security and national military strategies.  
B. U.S. GRAND STRATEGY 
Prior to the end of the Cold War, the primary focus of 
the U.S. Grand Strategy was the containment of the Soviet 
Union and Communism throughout the world. [Ref. 20:p. 10] 
With the end of the Cold War the U.S. Grand Strategy 
shifted to reflect the U.S. role as the lone superpower 
while focusing on increased economic growth.  The three 
main areas that were stressed throughout the eight years of 
the Presidency of William Clinton were: 
· Enhancing our security by maintaining a strong 
defense capability 
· Promoting prosperity at home by increasing access 
to foreign markets to increase economic growth 
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· Promoting democracy abroad and continue to 
provide incentives for foreign government to 
utilize the democratic free market process [Ref. 
21] 
The ideas of strengthening U.S. security centered on 
military being able to fight two major regional conflicts 
at the same time.  Additionally the administration wanted 
to strengthen foreign allies in an effort to ensure 
worldwide stability and reduce the threat of “nuclear, 
chemical, biological and conventional conflict.” [Ref. 
21:p. 5]  
At the same time, the administration used this period 
of transition to work closely with countries formerly in 
the Soviet orbit, with the establishment of the Partnership 
for Peace (PFP) initiative.  Military to military 
activities increased with several countries, especially in 
Europe.  Ultimately, programs such as PFP were the prelude 
to several countries joining NATO, such as Poland, the 
Czech Republic, and Hungary in 1999. 
The other two areas concerned the U.S. economy. During 
the Clinton Presidency, the government was able to reduce 
unemployment and keep it relatively low as well as reduce 
the national deficit.  At the same time the average 
individual take-home pay (which does not include bonuses 
and COLA) difference between civilian and military 
personnel steadily increased from 1983-1999.  By 1999 the 
difference in the pay gap was 13.5%. [Ref. 14] 
With a strong U.S. dollar, other regions became open 
to U.S. influence, including the establishment of fast food 
chains in places like China, increased exports to Asia and 
the Middle East and countries like Poland, the Czech 
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Republic, and Hungary formerly influenced by the Soviet 
Union.  For example, in 1997, the U.S. dominated the 
Chinese market (both China and Hong Kong) for French Fries 
(primarily through fast food restaurants) with 97% of the 
market, an estimated 2.2 million dollars.  The Chinese fast 
food market generated a total of over 3.6 billion dollars, 
with almost 20% of that total going to U.S. restaurants 
such as McDonald’s with almost 200 restaurants and Kentucky 
Fried Chicken with over 250 restaurants in China. [Ref. 22] 
C. MILITARY STRATEGY 
The first of three major writings, which stated the 
strategy for the Navy and Marine Corps for the late 20th 
Century, was the Proceedings article “The Way Ahead” [Ref 
15] written in April 1991 by the Secretary of the Navy H. 
Lawrence Garrett III, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) 
Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, and Commandant of the Marine 
Corps (CMC) General A.M. Gray.  This article stated the 
initial plan for how the Navy and Marine Corps were going 
to change in response to the new international environment. 
This article also was a statement to Congress about the 
Navy’s and Marine Corps efforts to gain a bigger share of 
the decreasing Defense budget. 
The senior leadership recognized that military 
strategy had to change from pursuing containment to 
pursuing world stability. For the members of the Navy and 
Marine Corps, this meant the focus had now changed from a 
major conflict against the Soviet Union to being flexible 
enough to be involved in multiple military operations at 
the same time. The four primary ideas that are in the 
article are: 1) lessening of the focus on the Soviet Union 
as a threat and the emergence of third world or rogue 
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nations, 2) more emphasis on new missions, 3) restructuring 
the two services, and 4) a politically motivated argument 
on how the two services were flexible enough to rapidly 
respond to any crisis especially with the decrease of U.S. 
military bases overseas. 
The article acknowledged that the new military 
strategy would place less emphasis on the Soviet Union.  
However, the Soviet Union was still viewed as the greatest 
single military threat to the U.S. and could not be 
dismissed.  However, as the Gulf War showed, new emphasis 
has to be placed on third world countries and rogue states 
that may one day possess weapons of mass destruction.  
Therefore, the ability of the Navy and Marine Corps to 
constantly be forward deployed throughout the world will 
play a major role in deterring regional conflicts and 
aggression. [Ref. 17:p. 38] 
The article also discusses the importance of being 
involved in conflicts other than war.  The senior 
leadership had the foresight to see the importance of 
issues: 
Such as presence; humanitarian assistance; nation 
building; security assistance; and peacekeeping, 
counter narcotic, counter terrorist, 
counterinsurgency, and crisis-response 
operations-will receive new emphasis as we focus 
our efforts    on developing and maintaining 
regional stability.  [Ref. 17:p. 41] 
The article shows that senior military leadership was 
attempting to alert their members and Congress of their 
willingness to take on new missions in an effort to gain a 
bigger share of the defense budget. 
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The third point deals with restructuring.  Dealing 
with uncertainty requires an ability to change the size and 
capabilities of the forward deployed forces, based on 
threat and situation.  Also, the senior leadership used 
this part of the article to make their case for the active 
and reserve forces needed to support a 450 ship Navy, plus 
three active and one reserve Marine division/wing teams 
(Marine Expeditionary Forces). [Ref. 17:p. 45] 
The final point made is the rationale for more 
spending for Navy and Marine Corps forces and technology.  
The arguments presented center on the effectiveness of 
strategic sealift for the first 60 days of Operation Desert 
Shield, mine warfare capabilities, and the ability of the 
Navy to be rapidly deployed, and the ability of the Marines 
to provide logistics support for troops on the ground. 
[Ref. 17:p. 44] This new strategy, as presented by the 
senior leadership for the Navy and Marine Corps, was the 
first step in adapting to the new strategic direction in 
the post-Cold War era.  
The problem with the new strategy as presented in this 
article is that the Navy and Marine Corps did not persuade 
many that they were actually making any organizational 
changes.  The Navy still wanted to maintain a 450 ship 
Navy.  Also, both the Marines and the Navy asked for more 
money to develop and produce military products to increase 
the technology gap between the U.S. and the rest of the 
world.  Later that year during congressional hearings, 
Congress proved to be very cold to the new naval strategy 
and questioned whether the Navy was really adapting to the 
new National Strategy. 
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In an effort to answer their critics in Congress, the 
Navy and Marine Corps produced two white papers “…From the 
Sea” [Ref. 18] in 1992, which was updated with 
“Forward…From the Sea” [Ref. 19] in 1994.  The new 
Secretary of the Navy, Sean O’Keefe; the CNO, Admiral Frank 
B. Kelso II; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, C. E. 
Mundy Jr. wrote “…From the Sea” with an emphasis on 
littoral warfare, featuring the Navy and Marine Corps in 
joint task forces.  Under this concept and new 
organizational structure, there would be one unified 
commander in which the command of the task force could be 
transferred from the sea to land if and when the operation 
switched to a land based campaign. 
In this white paper, the Navy acknowledged that the 
Navy of the future would conduct most of its operations in 
the littoral environment.  (Littoral in this instance 
includes a limited area of the land, sea, and air and all 
the assets that operate in such a compressed area.) This 
was a major change in doctrine as the Navy truly moved from 
focusing on operations in the open ocean to joint 
expeditionary force operations in a compressed littoral 
area.   
“…From the Sea” discusses the changes in doctrine and 
threats to joint forces in the future:  mines, short-range 
missiles, coastal batteries, and coastal submarine forces. 
[Ref. 18:pp. 4-5] Therefore, the senior leadership saw the 
need to form stronger ties with other U.S. military forces, 
such as the Coast Guard, Air Force, Army, and Special 
Operations forces.  In this white paper, the Navy and 
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Marine Corps laid the groundwork for future integrated 
joint military operations. 
“FORWARD…From the Sea” in 1994 updated the original 
1992 white paper “…From the Sea.”  Unlike its predecessor, 
“FORWARD…From the Sea” stressed the Navy and Marine Corps 
involvement in peacetime stability operations. As of 1994, 
the Clinton Administration wanted all the services to 
address the U.S. military’s involvement with peacekeeping 
missions. [Ref. 23:p. 13] This white paper was in part the 
Navy and Marine Corps’ response to the Administration’s 
concerns. 
This particular white paper addressed what role the 
Naval and Marine assets played in joint expeditionary 
forces assigned to peacetime operations. The primary means 
for conducting these operations remained the Carrier Battle 
Group along with an Amphibious Ready Group. The ability to 
have U.S. warships forward deployed worldwide was seen as 
providing a constant political and military presence. This 
joint task force could be used to promote democracy, 
stability, and to defuse escalating conflicts throughout 
the world. [Ref. 19:p. 5] The impact of the new strategy 
would have profound effects especially for naval officers 
in the surface community. 
D. INCENTIVES FOR SWO’S IN THE 20TH CENTURY 
The 1990’s proved to be a decade of change for the 
surface officer community.  As the National and Military 
Strategy changed, the Navy’s organizational structure also 
changed.  The impact on the manning of the surface officer 
community will be discussed later. However, three areas of 
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focus are: 1) the Temporary Early Retirement Act 2) 
educational programs 3) and career opportunities. 
1. Temporary Early Retirement Act (TERA) 
In an effort to meet Congressional demands to decrease 
personnel strength, the Navy proposed to decrease its 
active duty numbers by over one third, from 592,652 in 
Fiscal Year (FY) 1989 to 394,900 in FY 1999. [Ref. 24]  To 
help facilitate the reductions, Congress enacted Public Law 
102-484 the Temporary Early Retirement Act (TERA) on 
October 23, 1992.  
Under the program, personnel were allowed to leave the 
Navy as early as the 15-year point and receive a retirement 
package of 35.625% or more of the service member’s base pay 
vice the traditional 50% at the 20-year point.  The 
following excerpt gives a more detailed description of how 
the program worked. 
The 15-year TERA program allowed members to 
retire at 15 years of service, with retired pay 
calculated at 2½% per year minus a reduction 
factor.  The reduction factor was added by the 
law and states that retirement pay shall be 
reduced by 1/12th of 1 percent for each full month 
by which the number of months of active service 
of the member are less than 240 as of the date of 
the member’s retirement.  The formula for 
determining the reduction factor is ([240-
x]/1200) where x=number of months of active 
service. [Ref. 25:p. 1]  
The following table gives examples on what the 
actually pay scale was for the various point of one’s 
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Length of Service  
Years Months % of basic pay 
15 0 35.625 
16 0 38.400 
17 0 41.225 
18 0 44.100 
19 0 47.025 
19 11 49.750 
 
Table 4.1. The Actuarial Table for the Temporary Early 
Retirement Act.  After: DoD Actuary [Ref. 25:pp. 2-4] 
 
2. Educational Programs 
Senior leadership recognized the need for advanced 
education for junior officers. During the 1990’s various 
graduate education programs were stressed to include the 
Naval Postgraduate School, other educational programs as 
described in OPNAVINSTRUCTION 1520.23B (Graduate 
Education), and financial assistance such as the Tuition 
Assistance program as described in OPNAVINSTRUCTION 1560.9.  
These programs provided various avenues for junior officers 
to attain graduate education. 
For the Navy, increased education was intended to 
accomplish three things:  improve the education level of 
future leaders, develop more computer skills, and provide 
an incentive for remaining in service. Providing advanced 
education while in the military, obligates service members 
to more time in service will making them more attractive in 
the private sector upon completion of their military 
service.   
Allowing SWOs the opportunity to earn a master’s 
degree during their initial shore duty provides an 
incentive for junior officers to remain in the community.  
These opportunities kept junior officers in the Surface 
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Community until the completion of their two department head 
tours, approximately the 11-year point.  The hope is that 
most officers will have invested enough time in service 
that the service member will continue until at least the 
20-year point. 
3. Career Opportunity  
Unfortunately there were few incentives to keep the 
Surface Warfare Officer in the Navy in the early 1990’s.  
This was partly due to the congressionally mandated 
reduction of personnel, billets, and ships in the Navy.  
Before the Congressional mandate to decrease the size of 
the military, opportunities to achieve command were 
relatively plentiful.  However, with the reduction and/or 
decommissioning of ships such the Patrol Combatant Missile 
(PHM), Tank Landing Ships (LST), and Battleships (BB), the 
prospect of command was greatly reduced.  
The strong U.S. economy throughout the 1990’s was a 
major factor in officers leaving the Navy to pursue more 
lucrative career opportunities in the private sector. Also, 
the culture within the surface community of tough love and 
long hours led to many junior officers getting out of the 
Navy or transferring to other communities. The following 
tables, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4, show the number of personnel 
laterally transferring into and from the surface community 
for those members of FY groups 1983-1990 which stayed to 
the O-4 boards.    
As these tables show, a net total of 209 surface 
warfare officers left the community for other communities. 
Approximately 39% of the FY groups 83-90 that stayed in the 
Navy to the O-4 boards transferred from another community, 
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or after failing out of their initial training pipeline 
transferred in. Thus for whatever reason the surface 
community was losing qualified officers to other 
communities at a significant rate. 
 
 
Transfers to SWO that 
 
Stayed to O-4 
Selection Board 
Program failure Number 





Lateral Transfers  
Fleet Support 714 






Total Transferred In 921 
 
Table 4.2. SWO Lateral Transfers In.  From: [Ref. 26:p. 
32] 
 






Fleet Support 633 
Restricted Line Other 331 
Total Transfer Out 1130 
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Fleet Support +81 
Restricted Line Other -326 
Total SWO Net Transfer -209 
 
Table 4.4. SWO Net Transfers.  After: [Ref. 26:p. 39] 
 
E. MANPOWER ISSUES/FUTURE 
Section D, above discussed manning issues that the 
surface community faced during the 1990’s.  The focus of 
this section will be on four year groups 83-86. To help 
provide further analysis, Table 4.5 breaks down the 
retention rate for SWOs that stayed until the O-4 boards.  
Table 4.6 shows the promotion rate for the SWO community 
for those that stayed till the O-4 boards (this table 
includes those that transferred into the community and are 
part of the FY groups 83-86).  Table 4.7 is provided to 
show what the standard surface officer career path is. 
 
  Year Group  Sample Mean 
Community 83 84 85 86  
SWO 32.3% 31.1% 26.3% 22.9% 28.15% 
SUB 32.4% 32.5% 31.5% 24.9% 30.325% 
AIR 43.0% 49.7% 45.8% 47.3% 46.45% 
 
Table 4.5. URL Retention Rates YG 83-86 to O-4.  After: 
[Ref. 26:p. 36] 
 
  Year  Group  Sample Mean 
Community 83 84 85 86  
SWO 76.2% 69.7% 69.8% 67.8% 70.875% 
SUB 80.0% 75.4% 80.8% 82.2% 79.6% 
AIR 68.1% 68.1% 70.1% 62.3% 67.15% 
 
Table 4.6. URL Promotion Rates YG 83-86 to O-4.  After: 
[Ref. 26:p. 36] 
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SWO Career Path
Shore tour (NPGS, Aide, SWOS inst…)
First Department Head Tour
Second Department Head Tour
Shore tour (Joint, Subspecialty, Training Cmd,…) or Afloat Staff/ Complex tour
XO Tour
Shore tour (Joint, major staff, acquisition,…) or Afloat Staff / Complex tour
CDR Command












































Second Division Officer Tour
First  Division Officer Tour
 
Table 4.7. Notional Surface Officer Career Path. 
 
The surface and submarine communities showed a 
constant decreasing retention trend in Table 4.5.  This 
trend correlated to the Congressional mandate to decrease 
the military through various means. Also, this time period 
saw the gap between military pay and the private sector 
continue to widen.  Another factor for the decreasing 
retention numbers was the low promotion rate that 
correlated with numbers in Table 4.6. These and other 
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quality of life issues were major factors in the decreased 
retention. 
In 1996 the U.S. military was still working to meet 
its goal of reducing its active duty numbers by 30% by FY 
97. [Ref. 27]  The retention numbers indicated two things. 
First, the Navy was achieving their goal of reducing 
personnel.  Secondly, retention numbers were so low among 
junior officers that manning problems for surface officers 
would be on the horizon if retention did not improve. 
Senior leadership may have missed the warning signals as 
the retention situation continued to worsen in the late 
1990s.  As will be discussed in Chapter V, changes in the 
Surface Navy culture had to be undertaken to retain enough 
junior officers to man the fleet. 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The U.S. Grand and Military Strategies underwent a 
transformation during the 1990’s as the Soviet Union 
collapsed, and the U.S. government focused on domestic 
issues in the post-Cold War era.  The major focus during 
the Clinton Administration was to strengthen the U.S. 
economy by promoting world stability through free trade and 
multinational military exercises, more peacekeeping 
missions, and sizing the U.S. military’s to fight two 
regional conflicts at the same time.   
In the early 1990’s the Navy addressed these issues 
through three white papers: “The Way Ahead”, “…From the 
Sea”, and “FORWARD…From the Sea.” These three white papers 
laid out how the Navy and Marine Corps were going to be 
structured to face the threats that lay ahead.  Their major 
point was that the Navy and Marine Corps is a joint war-
  36 
fighting tool that is always forward deployed. Therefore, 
it can be used as both a political and military instrument 
in preventing, defusing, or winning conflicts worldwide. 
Also, the Navy and Marine Corps would remain a strong 
organization while streamlining and cutting its personnel 
and infrastructure by over 30% from 1989 to 1999. 
For the Surface Warfare Community, the 1990s saw 
personnel leaving for various reasons.  The increase in pay 
in the private sector was a financial incentive for many 
officers to leave the military. TERA allowed personnel to 
get out of the military prior to the 20-year point and 
still receive a retirement paycheck, which helped reduce 
personnel numbers.   
However, the retention numbers for YG 83-86 slipped, 
by almost 10%, for those that were eligible for the O-4 
boards.  By the time YG 86 went up for its O-4 boards, 
Surface Warfare Officer retention was down to 22.9%, and of 
that only 67.8% were promoted which was the lowest for the 
four-year groups.  These indicators should have been a 
signal to senior leadership an that inability to retain 
junior officers in the community would lead to manning and 
billet issues that would have to be addressed in the 
future. 
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V. U.S. STRATEGY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: CONTINUITY 
AND CHANGE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will discuss U.S. Grand and Military 
Strategies for the 21st Century. We can expect the U.S. 
Grand Strategy to reflect the terrorist events of September 
11, 2001.  However, these events will not change the core 
objectives of the U.S. Grand Strategy.  The Military 
Strategy will focus on the Navy’s role in the 21st Century, 
and specifically the Navy’s role in homeland defense. 
When writing this chapter the following assumption was 
made. While the terrorist events of September 2001 have 
made eliminating terrorist organizations and homeland 
defense a primary focus of the Bush administration.  The 
core national policies are the same from the Clinton 
administration to the Bush administration.  This assumption 
is based on the fact that the Bush administration has 
failed to produce a National Strategic Plan as mandated by 
the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act 
of 1986.  If the Bush administration had a major change of 
policies then it would have produced guidelines stating the 
new direction of the administration to Congress and the 
American people. 
B. U.S. GRAND STRATEGY 
U.S. Grand Strategy for the 21st Century consists of 
three core objectives: 1) Enhance America’s security 2) 
Bolster America’s economic prosperity 3) Promote democracy 
and human rights abroad. [Ref. 26] The terrorist acts of 
September 11, 2001 brought about several changes for U.S. 
security agencies in support of homeland defense.  
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We often think of America’s homeland security in terms 
of security forces within the U.S. boundaries.  Yet, when 
the President talks about enhancing U.S. security as 
described in “A National Security Strategy for a New 
Century” [Ref. 28], he talks about enhancing our influence 
and strengthening our diplomatic ties abroad to ensure 
security at home.  By continuing the U.S. policy of 
engagement and providing global leadership the U.S. is able 
to encourage the international community to become a 
worldwide security force against those governmental and 
nongovernmental organizations that pose a threat to 
international security. This strategy of cooperative 
security addresses six major threats against U.S. 
interests, which are: 
· Regional or State-Centered Threats 
· Transnational threats 
· Spread of dangerous technologies 
· Failed states 
· Foreign intelligence collection 
· Environmental and health threats [Ref. 28:pp. 2-
3] 
Also, in this document the President recognized the 
need for a strong military as an instrument of diplomacy.  
As the U.S. moved into the 21st Century, the military saw a 
significant increase in the defense budget. The increase in 
defense spending shows a commitment to a stronger military 
as the President and Congress recognize current and future 
military issues with readiness, modernization, and 
improvement in quality of life issues. [Ref. 28] 
As was the policy in the post-Cold War era the U.S. 
will continue to bolster America’s economic prosperity 
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through globalization.  Globalization allows the U.S. to 
promote free trade. Globalization also brings an 
interchange of ideas, cultures, political views, 
information, and technology.  
This is both good and bad.  It’s good because a stable 
and prosperous economic market reduces the risk of 
aggression for fear of upsetting international stability.  
However, globalization also allows adversaries access to 
technology, capital, information, and the ability to spread 
their views to others. [Ref. 28] 
Finally, the last of the three core ideas for the 21st 
Century is the promotion of democracy and human rights 
abroad.  The U.S. will likely continue to support 
democratic government throughout the world, especially for 
those governments that are trying to transform a 
democratic, free market society.  During the 1990’s, the 
U.S. helped several countries that went from a Communist 
form of government to a democratic form of government; that 
process can be expected to continue throughout the 21st 
Century.   
Humanitarian issues will continue to be a concern.  
Areas such as Africa, China, and Europe will remain the 
primary focus for humanitarian efforts.  However, direct 
U.S. involvement will be limited to those areas deemed to 
hold vital national interest, avoiding repeats of the 
Somalia campaign of 1992-3. [Ref. 29]  The lesson to be 
learned from the 1990’s is that international humanitarian 
agencies such as the U.N. and Red Cross (with financial 
support of the U.S.) should be primary alternatives. Unless 
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international outcry and pressure determines otherwise, 
direct commitments should be avoided. [Ref. 30] 
1. Impact of September 11, 2001 
Even though the core objectives of the U.S. Grand 
Strategy have remained the same after the terrorist acts 
against the U.S. in September 2001 the fight against 
terrorism is the number one focus of the Bush 
administration.  Along with this new focus there has been a 
change for some federal agencies related to security.  The 
Immigration & Naturalization Services (INS) is being looked 
at for overhaul or being dismantled altogether.  The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation is considering changes to 
its primary focus-from investigations to homeland security. 
Finally, President Bush created the OFFICE of HOMELAND 
DEFENSE with an executive order on October 8, 2001, with 
the appointment of Governor Tom Ridge as director. [Ref. 
30] 
All of these changes were the direct result of the 
terrorist events of September 11, 2001.  The terrorist acts 
showed that the U.S. was vulnerable to attacks on its 
homeland. The event not only changed the American 
lifestyle, it also changed the focus of the Bush 
Administration from domestic issues like the budget deficit 
and the energy crisis to the worldwide fight against 
terrorism. 
Tremendous amounts of money, military personnel, 
intelligence, training, and other governmental support have 
been given worldwide attention in an effort to track down 
and eliminate terrorist organizations and governments that 
support terrorist throughout the world.  As of May 2002, 
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military advisors have been sent to the Philippines, 
Georgia, Columbia, and other countries in an effort to root 
out terrorists and drug lords.  The U.S. led coalition will 
likely continue to have a major role in Afghanistan, even 
after the expulsion of the Taliban Government as a new 
Afghanistan government takes form.   
For the U.S. Navy, the primary impact will be more 
missions in the area.  The Navy will see an increase in 
Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) off the coast of 
Pakistan and its surrounding waters.  Also, military assets 
that are used for collection, targeting, and propaganda 
will have increased missions in Afghanistan and the 
surrounding region. 
C. MILITARY STRATEGY 
As always, the Military Strategy is in support of the 
Grand Strategy.  To this end the Chairman of the Joint 
Chief of Staffs (CJCS) wrote “Joint Vision 2020” [Ref. 31] 
to provide a clear vision for the U.S. Military for the 21st 
Century.  The title “America’s Military: Preparing for 
Tomorrow” continues the vision of “Joint Vision 2010” in 
June 2000, which talks about transforming the military. 
With any organization, information superiority is 
highly conducive to survival and success.  The CJCS 
recognizes this and stresses the importance of collecting, 
processing, and properly disseminating information. A 
military organization that has the best information and the 
ability to act according to that information allows for 
better decision-making capabilities.  [Ref. 31] 
As the 1990s showed, the military has to be able to 
thrive in a joint environment.  The ability to train, 
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coordinate tactics, pass information and maintain 
interoperability will be major foundations of success and 
effectiveness.  Jointness includes not only U.S. forces but 
also the multinational operational environment.  The 
ability to train and function with various countries in 
multinational operations will continue to be vital as the 
outlook for future conflicts will involve some form of a 
multinational force. 
As the events of September 11, 2001 showed the need 
for increased cooperation between government agencies is a 
necessity to increase the security of the U.S. homeland.  
The Department of Defense has to strengthen its 
organizational structure and capabilities to work with 
other federal agencies, ”non-governmental organizations, 
private voluntary organizations, and regional and 
international organizations for the purpose of 
accomplishing an objective.” [Ref. 31] Strengthening the 
ties with the various agencies will go a long way towards 
deterring and preventing such attacks as those of September 
2001. 
1. Impact on the Surface Navy 
The Surface Navy is constantly forward deployed, and 
this will not change.  Globalization has made it possible 
for smaller countries to have major effects on economic 
activities. Asia has become a great beneficiary of 
globalization, and currently has 40% of the world’s 
purchasing power.  In addition, China is an up and coming 
military and economic power.  Some economists believe China 
could pass the U.S. as the world’s largest economy by 2020. 
[Ref. 32:p. 6] 
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The U.S. has a vested interest in various parts of the 
world.  The Middle East will continue to be a place of 
tension and conflict. Even though the Middle East is not a 
major direct source of oil to the U.S. (less then 20%) they 
are a major distributor to its allies.  Oil from the Middle 
East constitutes 50% of the oil for Europe and 80% for 
Japan.  Thus any disruption in this flow of oil has a major 
impact on the economy of our allies. [Ref. 32] 
In order to adequately defend both the interests of 
the U.S. and its allies the Navy, operational tempo will 
likely increase as the fleet shrinks.  New and increased 
training focused primarily on terrorism will also occupy 
the Navy. As the threat of terrorist attacks increases and 
a large-scale naval attack decreases, new strategies and 
tactics have to be developed, and incorporated into the 
training for the crew. 
Also, as the number of military bases overseas is 
reduced, the burden of maintaining forward presence will 
fall on the Navy. Lessons learned from operations in Iraqi 
and Bosnia (e.g. both Saudi Arabia and France refused to 
let U.S. forces use their airspace for military strikes) 
indicates an increased role for the Navy and Marine Corps.  
The Navy and Marine Corps teams, built from Carrier Air 
Wings and Amphibious Ready Groups, can alleviate problems 
that arise when countries deny access to their airspace. 
The Navy and Marine Corps team faces the same airspace 
restrictions as the Air Force and Army for landlocked 
countries. However, for coastal countries the flexibility 
and mobility of the Navy and Marine Corps allow for a 
sustained military presence. [Ref. 32:p. 10]  
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D. CONCLUSION 
As a new millennium begins the core objectives of the 
U.S. remain the same.  The terrorist attacks on the U.S. on 
September 11, 2001 have brought the fight against terrorism 
to the forefront.  The 21st Century will see a transformed 
military in an effort to meet the needs of government and 
face the new threats of the future. For the Navy, the 
mission and objectives remain the same as the Navy and 
Marine Corps continue to be a constantly forward deployed.  
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VI. INCENTIVES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses future incentives for the 
Surface Warfare Officers and what will drive those 
incentives.  As with any organization, quality of life and 
increased education will remain important as the Navy 
continues to become more technologically advanced.  Also, 
retention and manning will continue to be a focus for 
senior naval leadership as part of restructuring its 
organization to meet future threats.  In addition, 
government and military officials will continue efforts to 
reduce the pay gap between the military and the private 
sector. 
The chapter will focus on the Surface Warfare Officer 
Continuation Pay and the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) program 
as primary financial incentives. The chapter will consider 
other possible financial incentives.  These will be 
instrumental as the community continues to find ways to 
convince officers to stay in the Navy, and also in the 
surface warfare officer community. 
B. EDUCATION AND QUALITY OF LIFE  
Education will continue to remain a top priority in 
for the surface community.  In an effort to improve the 
organization and provide incentives for junior officers to 
remain in the surface community, more educational programs 
are planned in areas that will make officers more 
attractive in the private sector once they finish their 
military career.  Also, more SWOs will have the opportunity 
earlier in their career to earn a masters degree. 
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In an effort to increase junior SWOs retention, an 
increased opportunity to earn an MBA, various engineering, 
and other technical degrees will increase.  In 2001, the 
only way to earn an MBA as a SWO was on your own, having 
the Navy pay 75% of the tuition, or through one of the 
limited major university MBA partnership programs. [Ref 33]  
In an effort to better meet the educational needs of junior 
SWOs, an MBA program has been established at the Naval 
Postgraduate School as of 2002. Not only are more SWOs 
being given the opportunity to earn an MBA, but enrollment 
for SWOs is also scheduled to increase at NPS.   
In the 21st Century more SWOs will attend graduate 
level education immediately upon commissioning.  Currently 
there are pilot programs that allow newly commissioned 
ensigns to earn a masters degree prior to their first 
operational assignment. This educational opportunity will 
not only be for Naval Academy graduates, but also for NROTC 
graduates.  Most of these programs are in technical fields, 
as the Navy will seek to enhance officers in technical 
skills [Ref. 34] 
1. Quality of Life 
Quality of Life programs will continue to improve 
throughout the 21st Century.  For the surface warfare 
officers this includes an improvement in job satisfaction 
and in having more time with their families.  In many 
surveys conducted by senior leadership in the 1990s one of 
the top reasons given by junior officers for leaving the 
Navy or the surface community was not enough time with 
families.  The late 20th century was plagued by redundant 
inspections, increased time at sea, and long working hours 
while in port.  
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At the beginning of the 21st Century the surface Navy 
was already addressing these issues.  In the future the 
surface officer can expect to see a reduction in 
inspections as Commanding Officers (COs) are given more 
leeway for integrating inspections into their deployment 
cycle.  COs having more power creates a better command 
climate, that will allow junior officers more freedom, 
promote creativity, and provide better experience.  Fewer 
inspections in the inter-deployment training cycle reduces 
the weekly preparations, and allows increased amounts of 
time with families. [Ref. 35] 
An increased effort to “homestead” officers in a 
particular area will be made to improve the quality of 
life, and to promote the Navy as a family oriented 
organization.  Homesteading reduces the number of transfers 
and abundance of family stress.  The issue of homesteading 
was raised in the late 1990s, but as the defense budget 
goes through its cycles of ups and downs, homesteading will 
be one way to save money. At the same time, families can 
settle in an area.   
C. RETENTION AND MANNING 
Retention and manning will always be an important 
issue in the surface community.  New technologies will 
allow the surface navy to sustain a fleet that requires 
less maintenance and personnel.  Also, as the military goes 
through the cycle of manning highs and lows, technology 
will be instrumental in reducing manning problems in the 
future. 
As the mandated reduction in military personnel ends, 
the surface navy faces a huge retention problem.  As of 
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April 2002, there were a total of 8166 surface line 
officers and 242 ships in the surface navy.  Currently, 
4330 are in at-sea billets, 1641 are in educational or 
training assignments, and the other 2195 are on shore duty. 
[Ref. 34] One of the major results of the retention problem 
the surface community is currently facing is not retaining 
enough division officers to grow future department heads.   
The surface community needs to retain 34-38% of their 
junior officers, and as of 2001 the Navy saw a significant 
rise in retention with 45% for year group 95 compared to 
year groups 93 and 94 with 24% and 29% respectively. [Ref. 
36] At that rate the department head screening rate would 
need to be near 100% just to fill the necessary billets.  
The following charts provide the retention rate for year 
groups 87-01. [Ref. 37]  Table 6.1 highlights the retention 
rates.  Figure 6.1 gives a graphical representation of the 
retention numbers of the aforementioned year groups. 
 
  49 
YG87 YG88 YG89 YG90 YG91 YG92 YG93 YG94 YG95 YG96 YG97 YG98 YG99 YG00 YG01
1 1407 1298 1070 951 955 799 664 699 800 834 696 700 846 965 903
2 1527 1337 1154 990 999 813 725 734 816 833 741 758 890 986 917 920
3 1495 1352 1166 1005 974 759 781 753 826 811 727 760 883 990 930
4 1392 1278 1082 910 857 635 712 703 757 729 700 717 848 835
5 995 923 785 678 665 629 616 630 633 655 603 706 655
6 727 699 577 557 523 511 476 475 515 520 570 505
7 543 528 510 421 422 385 361 370 426 489 400
8 396 383 397 308 320 269 265 241 369 320
9 320 318 310 237 225 220 196 216 275
10 308 262 260 205 207 204 189 250
11 259 231 237 183 191 195 230
12 216 189 190 169 176 210
13 184 172 178 158 200
14 170 159 169 190
15 170 154 180
164 170
Snapshot Retention Rate: 11% 11% 14% 16% 18% 26% 24% 29% 45% 60% 78% 93% 96% - - - - - -
SWO: 9 YCS vs. 3 YCS 21% 24% 27% 24% 23% 29% 25% 29% - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
FY02 Projected Inventory 162 148 168 155 171 131 182 189 297 467 540 679 842 988 915
FY02 Required Inventory 170 180 190 200 210 230 250 275 320 400 505 655 835 930 920
- - -
Good inventory level
Retention Rate =  [Current Inventory] / [YCS3 Inventory] Acceptable inventory level
 
Table 6.1. SWO Retention. From: [Ref. 37] 
 
  50 













1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
YCS
 
Figure 6.1. SWO Retention. From: [Ref. 37] 
 
As Table 6.1 shows, over an 8-year period for year 
groups 87-94 the retention percentage was well below 38%. 
This corresponds to the manning reduction, but also shows 
there is a real problem with junior officer retention.  The 
legend in Table 6.1 also applies to Figure 6.1, which is 
another depiction of the same data. Figure 6.1 shows the 
projected number of officers for each year group for a one 
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year period.  The graph shows that retention should be 
above the 275 SWOs necessary for department head tours per 
year groups for years 96 and above.  
1. Manning 
Figure 6.2 shows the breakdown of billets for the 
surface community with surpluses and shortages for the 
various ranks. [Ref. 34] Figure 6.3 also shows where the 
surface navy is short in various ranks, including a current 
shortage at the department head level.  Note the situation 
varies within pay grades.  There is a surplus of SWO 
Officers in the more junior LT (0-3) positions for (YG 95-
97), but a shortage in the more senior LT positions (YG 92-
94) that correlates to the officer shortage at the 
department head positions. [Ref. 35] 
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Figure 6.2. Surface Officer Billets. After: [Ref. 
34] 
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Figure 6.3. Surface Officer Manning Profile. From: 
[Ref. 35] 
 
As both Figures 6.2 and 6.3 clearly show, there is a 
significant shortage both at the department head and 
Lieutenant Commander (LCDR) level. Longer department head 
tours have been used to alleviate the problem.  However, 
the manpower situation should improve if current trends 
hold true (for year groups 96 and beyond). Parts D and E 
focus on the financial initiatives intended to increase 
surface officer retention. 
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D. CLOSING THE PAY GAP 
The difference in wages between the military and the 
private sector has always been a controversial.  Many but 
not all argue that the difference should be tracked and 
measured in accordance with the Employment Cost Index (ECI) 
as calculated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics which 
compares.  Others argue that the pay gap should be based on 
a comparison of civilian and military pay levels.  The 
following data, observations, and conclusions were compiled 
by using the ECI when comparing the differences in military 
and private sector wages.  
As previously mentioned, the 1990’s were a period of 
rapid economic growth.  At the beginning of the 1990’s, the 
pay gap was 11.2%. The difference in pay between the 
private sector and the military continued to increase and 
reached as high as 13.5% during 1998 and 1999. [Ref. 38]   
In an effort to close the pay gap, Congress authorized 
pay raises for the next three years and targeted specific 
pay grades (mid-grade officers and non-commissioned 
officers) in an effort to increase retention.  Yet, the gap 
was still at 7.6% at the beginning of 2002.  It is 
estimated that the pay gap will not be closed till 2017 
(based on ECI plus .5% pay raises.) [Ref. 38] 
For the next decade, those in the military will profit 
from the efforts made to address the manning shortages and 
the huge pay gap.  As the U.S. is now intimately involved 
in the war on terrorism, great efforts will be made to 
close the pay gap.  For surface officers, there are two 
positives.  
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One is that congressional leaders will be forced for 
the next decade to focus on the welfare and compensation of 
military personnel since the war on terrorism is sure to 
continue for many years.  Therefore, increased military pay 
should have strong support from U.S. citizens, which will 
in turn pressure Congress and the President to support 
increased pay raises.   
Secondly, due to the low retention in the 1990s SWOs 
that remain will have better chances of promotion. In order 
to meet the demands of the fleet, promotion percentages 
will likely increase at the Lieutenant Commander (LCDR) and 
Commander (CDR) level.  Not only will SWOs see a steady 
increase in their base pay, but they will also get another 
increase as they are promoted to LCDR and CDR. [Ref. 39] 
Again these results will be a byproduct of the retention 
problems that plagued the surface community in the late 
1990’s. 
E. SURFACE WARFARE CONTINUATION PAY (SWOCP) 
The SWOCP is a direct result of the past manning and 
retention problems.  The SWOCP was an acknowledgement by 
Congress and the senior Navy leadership that some financial 
incentives were necessary to address the growing retention 
problem in the surface community. The SWOCP will benefit 
the surface community in three ways: 1) increased 
retention, 2) reduced manning shortages, and 3) higher 
quality junior officers and department heads. 
The SWOCP is an incentive program that pays surface 
warfare officers a bonus of 50,000 dollars for those who 
stay through two department head tours.  To qualify for the 
program, an officer has to be selected for the Surface 
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Warfare Officer Department Head School.  Once the officer 
commits to attending department head school he/she is then 
eligible for the bonus.  Upon acceptance of the officer’s 
commitment to attend department head school, the officer 
will receive an initial payment of 10,000 dollars.  The 
second 10,000 dollars will be paid once the officer starts 
department head school.  Additionally the officer will 
receive an annual 10,000 bonus for the next three years 
based on the start date of the department head class the 
officer attended. 
When Navy leaders were first contemplating the idea of 
a bonus for junior officers, the goal was to retain 
approximately 275 surface officers per year group through 
the ten-year career point. [Ref. 40]  Studies were 
conducted considering three levels of payment over five 
payment periods. The suggested payments were 5,000, 10,000, 
and 15,000 dollars for five years for a total of 25,000, 
50,000 and 75,000 dollars respectively.   
Using the data from the nuclear officer and naval 
aviators bonus, the following conclusions were reached. The 
simulations showed as the bonus increases from a total of 
$25,000 to $75,000 the number of people staying in the 
community and the overall cost savings increased.  The 
direct billet (MPN, OPN, and other government agencies) 
savings realized were $21 million, $52 million, and $71 
million dollars for the $25k, $50k, and $75K payments 
respectively for an officer up to the rank of LCDR. [Ref. 
40] These figures were derived using the assumption that 
commissioning instructor or post-commissioning training 
costs do not decrease.   
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Table 6.2 [Ref. 37] shows that as of April 2002 1920 
surface officers have taken the bonus.  The 1920 officers 
are from year groups 91 and prior, and year groups 92-00.  
Between year groups 92-94 approximately the same number 
took the bonus.  However, those numbers drastically 
increased for year groups 95 and 96, which would suggest 
the Navy could meet its retention goal (38%) in the future.  
Thus, the bonus is a step in the right direction. [Ref. 37] 
Finally, the SWOCP provides an incentive for those top 
performers who would have otherwise left the Navy. It gives 
them a financial reason to stay in.  For some officers the 
rewards of serving in the military are not enough, and 
being financially secure is very important.  By having 
SWOCP, surface warfare officers have a form of compensation 
that makes remaining in the surface community and the Navy 
more attractive. 
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SWOCP Analysis by Year Group
YG 91 & senior YG 92 YG 93 YG 94 YG 95 YG 96 YG 97 YG 98 YG 99 YG 00 TOTAL
FY00 Recipients 688 185 163 132 172 67 1 0 0 0 1408
FY01 Recipients 4 2 10 28 39 131 80 1 0 0 295
FY02 Recipients 2 1 1 9 18 34 69 82 0 1 217
Total Recipients to Date 188 174 169 229 232 150 83 0 1 1920 Note 1
Current (31 JAN) Strength 198 192 225 381 499 578 710 847 991
YCS3 Strength 759 781 753 826 811 727 760 883 NA
Breakout by DHS Start Date
FY00 FY01 FY02 Total
Grandfathered 802 8 1 811
FY00 DHS 238 9 4 251
FY01 DHS 176 40 5 221
FY02 DHS 124 60 33 217
FY03 DHS 57 110 41 208
FY04 DHS 7 60 80 147
FY05 DHS 0 5 53 58
Total 1404 292 217 1913 Note 1
Cost $18.0M $13.2M $8.6M
Note 1:  Difference due to three FY00 (all YG95) recipients and one FY01 recipient (YG91) not yet having been assigned a DH class
Funding by FY
SWO Continuation Pay 
Analysis
•YG 98
Most officers have just screened for
Department Head
•YG 99 and Junior
Officers not yet eligible for SWOCP
because they have not yet screened
for Department Head
 
Table 6.2. SWOCP Data. From: [Ref. 37] 
 
F. THRIFT SAVINGS PLAN 
Finally, after years of speculation the military has 
its own version of the private sector’s 401k plan called 
the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP). TSP has been around since 
1986, but it was only for Federal civilian employees. 
President Clinton changed that on 30 October 2000 when he 
signed Public Law 106-398, which extended TSP to the 
uniformed services starting in October 2001. 
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TSP is a defined contribution plan, meaning that the 
military TSP account is dependent on the amount the service 
member contributes to the account during the working years 
of uniformed service. TSP is different than that of the 
uniformed services retirement system.  Under the Uniformed 
Services Retirement System a service member’s retirement 
pay is based on pay and time in service, with no 
contributions made by the service member. TSP is also 
voluntary.   
G. FUTURE INCENTIVES 
The aforementioned incentives will help assure that 
retention will increase for surface warfare officers.  
There are other incentives that may be initiated in the 
future: 1) Executive Officer Afloat Bonus and, 2) further 
reduction of inspections. 
The need for an Executive Officer Afloat bonus stems 
directly from the lack of retention of the 1990’s, and the 
strengthening U.S. economy.  The data currently show a lack 
of officers at the department head and LCDR level.  If 
officers get out after their two department head tour 
commitment to find more lucrative jobs in the private 
sector, there will be a shortage of Executive Officers 
afloat. These same circumstances led to the creation of the 
SWOCP, and the data would lead one to believe that a future 
bonus may be necessary to meet manning requirements for 
executive officers aboard ships. 
The 21st Century will also see a continued reduction of 
inspections for the surface navy.  In an effort to decrease 
the time surface sailors spend at work while in port, some 
inspections will be conducted only at the request of the 
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commanding officer.  This will be another way that the 
senior leadership will try to improve morale. 
Finally, as new ships like the San Antonio class LPDs 
and the new DDX enter the fleet and older ships are 
decommissioned, future junior officers will face less day 
to day adversity than their predecessors. An influx of new 
ships means less maintenance and more time to learn, train, 
and lead.  Therefore, instead of junior officers being 
preoccupied with paperwork related to maintenance and 
trouble shooting, they will have more time to learn about 
their ship, and will not have to work the extremely long 
hours which were required of junior officers in the 1990s. 
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Chapter VI has focused on various incentive programs 
available now and possibly in the future.  The chapter also 
discussed the issues that drove the need for a bonus for 
surface officers as a means to meet the current and future 
retention numbers of the Navy. The Navy’s commitment to 
these new incentive programs shows a renewed commitment 
towards strengthening the community.  This commitment will 
allow the surface officer community to be adequately manned 
to face its future tasks, in support of National and 
Military Strategies.  
Finally, for the first time surface officers are 
receiving a bonus.  The military services have their own 
401k plan in the form of the Thrift Savings Plan.  Also, 
increased retention numbers for year groups 95 and later 
should ensure that future department head tours will be 
back to the normal length of 36 months.  New ships, less 
maintenance, reduced inspections, and more family time 
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while in port should provide for a positive experience for 
junior officers, and should be reflected by increased 
retention. Therefore, the future is bright for the surface 
community, and now is a good time to be a SWO.  
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VII. CONCLUSION 
A.  SUMMARY 
The thesis identifies lessons learned from the Age of 
Sail, the relationship between National Strategy, Military 
Strategy, and Naval Strategy now.  Strategy in turn, 
determines naval missions, executing those missions 
requires certain types of behavior by naval officers. 
Understanding this relationship is key to structuring the 
proper incentive structure to produce the desired behavior 
for Surface Warfare Officers.  For the 1990s, the incentive 
structure was consistent with the mandated reduction of 
naval forces.  Through incentive programs such as the 
Temporary Early Retirement Act the Navy was able to meet 
its reduction goals.  Now the incentive structure for SWOs 
needs to encourage SWOs to do three things: 1) be prepared 
to serve at sea, 2) stay for a career, and 3) develop the 
skills necessary for command at sea. 
To accomplish these goals, naval leadership continues 
to make improvements in quality of life, bonuses, and 
education.  Improvements in quality of life such as a 
better working environment aboard ships, reduced 
inspections, and more family time in port improves morale 
and provides quality time at sea.  The establishment of the 
Surface Warfare Continuation Pay and Thrift Savings Plan 
has greatly contributed to the increased retention in year 
groups 95 and higher.  These financial incentives directly 
contribute to increased numbers of career officers in the 
surface community. How much they contribute is a matter for 
future study. Also, providing more advanced professional 
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educational opportunities develops the skills necessary for 
SWOs to be effective commanders at sea. 
The thesis also address the following secondary 
questions. 
· How did the Americans and British use incentives 
to their advantage during various conflicts (19th 
century until today)? 
· What were the imperfections in the incentive 
systems and how did the American and British 
Navies cope with them? 
· Based on the U.S. Grand Strategy of the late 20th 
century, did the government have the right 
incentives for Surface Warfare Officers? 
· What is the Grand Strategy for the United States 
for the 21st century? 
1. Incentives: 19th Century 
In the 19th century both the British and U.S. Navies 
understood that “incentives matter.”  One way crews were 
incentivized was through prospects of prize money.  In an 
effort to ensure that British and U.S. ships engaged the 
enemy, the crews were given a percentage of the prizes that 
were captured. Also, since there were more captains than 
ships available, competition to command a ship was 
intensified. 
Prize money as an incentive had positive effects for 
both navies in that they had better trained crews and were 
more tactically proficient in fighting their vessels.  
Increased training for the crew allowed for the British and 
U.S. to engage larger and more heavily equipped enemy 
vessels and win in battle.  Since the captains of the 
British and U.S. knew they often had to engage, it was in 
their best interest and that of their crew to be tactically 
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proficient.  Not only were they victorious in battle, but 
also they often suffered fewer casualties. 
2. Incentives: Disadvantages and Solutions 
Although useful as an incentive, prize money had its 
drawbacks. The politics of distributing the prize money 
often lead to a long delays before the crew received their 
money. In the U.S. Navy, prize money was a way of 
legalizing privateering, which lead to an attitude of every 
captain for himself. There was no uniformity of direction 
and leadership in the fleet.   
The U.S. Navy had another problem, in that they had a 
large number of foreigners, and many of them were deserted 
from the Navy. Prize money was not a useful incentive for 
them, as these foreigners joined the Navy looking for 
adventure and traveling opportunities.  
In an effort to address the prize money issue, the 
British Parliament passed a law that formalized the 
distribution of prize money based on Table 1.1 (page 6).  
This formal process reduced politics and delays. Formalized 
distribution of prize money caused the U.S. to adopt a 
standardized pay system.  The U.S. Navy moved away from 
prize money as an incentive and went to a system of 
salaries.   
To address the issue of desertion especially among 
foreign service members, the U.S. Navy increased investment 
in education as a means of increasing retention, improving 
manning, and attracting more American citizens.  The Naval 
Academy was established in 1845 and the Naval War College 
in 1884.  The establishment of both of these institutions 
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was an effort to attract more officers and teach the best 
practices for leadership, tactics, and naval war fighting.  
3. U.S. Grand Strategy Late 20th Century 
The end of the Cold War and the mandated reduction of 
military forces were the two factors that transformed the 
surface navy after 1989.  With the end of the Cold War, the 
government no longer feared a large-scale war in Europe and 
focused attention on homeland issues, especially 
strengthening the U.S. economy. To adjust to this new 
policy, the military focused on multiple regional 
conflicts, vice large-scale global warfare. 
After the end of the Cold War, the U.S. became the 
sole superpower.  As such, the U.S. was able to move from a 
policy of containment of the Soviet Union and the spread of 
Communism to focusing on increased global well being, and 
stability. Three main areas stressed throughout the 1990s 
were: 
· Enhancing our security by maintaining a strong 
defense capability 
· Promoting prosperity and economic growth at home 
by increasing access to foreign markets 
· Promoting democracy abroad and providing 
incentives for foreign governments to transition 
to democracy and democratic free markets [Ref. 
19] 
Maintaining a strong military was understood as the 
military’s ability to fight two major conflicts 
simultaneously. In an effort to help the military reduce 
the number of personnel, Congress passed the Temporary 
Early Retirement Act on October 23, 1992.  This allowed 
military members with at least 15 years of active service 
to retire. The Navy was able to meet its reduction goals.  
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However, for the surface warfare community, one could argue 
that this incentive worked too well and resulted in 
decreased retention.   
In the early 1990’s the Navy produced three white 
papers, which were the principal foundation for 
restructuring the Navy and Marine Corps.  The Navy and 
Marine Corps team was to be a forward deployed joint war-
fighting force used for both political and military 
purposes throughout the world.  The two services also 
recognized the need to prepare for military operations 
other than war, to include multinational military 
exercises, peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.  And, 
Even though the military was downsizing, the Navy and 
Marine Corps were able to meet all tasking in support of 
the U.S. Grand Strategy.  
4. U.S. Grand Strategy for the 21st Century 
Two significant events happened at the beginning of 
the 21st century.  First was the change of the presidency 
from the Democratic President William J. Clinton to the 
Republican President George W. Bush, Jr.  The second major 
event was the terrorist bombing of the U.S. on September 
11, 2001. Yet, the core principles of the U.S. Grand 
Strategy remain the same.  Even though President Bush has 
had the opportunity to produce a new national security 
strategy he has not, therefore it is safe to conclude that 
the core principles from the Clinton administration have 
not changed. With that said, the terrorist events of 
September 2001 have brought homeland security and the war 
against terrorism to the forefront of priorities for the 
Bush administration. 
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The immediate impact of these events for the surface 
community is that Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO), 
electronic surveillance, and increased air operations will 
be conducted off the coast of Pakistan and the surrounding 
area.   This does not necessarily mean an increase of time 
at sea for the surface warfare officers, but it does mean 
more operations and assets will we dedicated to this 
region.  The military has to adapt again to the changing 
world environment.  Not only do military forces have to 
prepare for multi-regional conflicts, but now rogue 
factions have proven they have the ability to attack the 
U.S. on its own soil. The military and the surface warfare 
community must respond to this new threat. 
To this end the surface community has to increase 
retention.  Now that the downsizing of the 1990s is over, 
senior naval leaders have to find new ways of keeping 
career SWOs through both financial and non-financial 
incentives.  The financial incentives include the Surface 
Warfare Officer Continuation Pay (SWOCP). Non-financial 
incentives include better educational opportunities and 
more time with family while in port.  Possible future 
incentives include a SWOCP for executive officers afloat 
and future reduction of inspections while in port.  All of 
these programs will ensure that the surface community is 
prepared to support the U.S. Grand and Military Strategies. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE  
This thesis focused on past lessons up till today, and 
how those lessons have been applied to incentives for the 
surface warfare officer.  This same structure approach 
applies to other communities in the Navy, or general 
services.  As the military went through downsizing in the 
  69 
1990s, every service saw a drop in retention. As the U.S. 
economy strengthened, every service had to create 
incentives for members to stay.  This study’s methods apply 
to officers, but also to the enlisted community. A similar 
study could be done for enlisted personnel incentives. 
This thesis also talked about the importance of the 
Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay.  The SWOCP was 
enacted at the end of the 20th century. Early numbers 
indicate that it is working, but an in-depth study should 
be conducted to find the actual impact on retention. 
Furthermore, a study could be undertaken to determine 
realized cost savings that have occurred when a larger 
sample group has taken the SWOCP bonus.  Hopefully, the 
study would determine if the current bonus is sufficient to 
permit shortening department head tours.  The study could 
also determine if a new bonus is necessary to ensure the 
numbers needed to fill the executive officers afloat 
billets. 
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